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Abstract The paper is dedicated to replies to Christiano’s criticism of Rawlsian 
public reason. Although Christiano’s criticism is successful in relation to one possi-
ble interpretation of the public reason view, a better and more fructuous interpre-
tation of the public reason view is at the disposition of the Rawlsian project. This 
view of public reason is deliberately an idealization. It shows how public justifica-
tion would function in a well-ordered society where citizens are committed to lib-
eral values. The shared reasons relevant for public justification are represented by 
the ideal of society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal citizens, 
as well as by the three features of the liberal conceptions of justice (basic rights and 
liberties, their priority, and the means to use them). In virtue of this view of public 
reason, it avoids Christiano’s objection of the utopianism of shared reasons, and it 
replies to the inequality argument, as well as to the generality and vagueness 
 objection, and the inconsistency argument. The advantages of the proposal in 
the view of public reason, in comparison to Christiano’s proceduralist democratic 
proposal, are shown in the reply to the inequality argument.
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1. It is a pleasure and an honour to 
have the opportunity to discuss the in-
fluential democratic proposal of Thomas 
Christiano. I focus my discussion on his 
sophisticated criticism of Rawlsian pub-
lic reason. Public reason is the view that 
says that the justification of laws and 
policies must not be based on controver-
sial doctrines. The public reason view is 
explained by John Rawls’ principle of le-
gitimacy.
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Our exercise of political power is 
fully proper only when it is exercised 
in accordance with a constitution, 
the essentials of which all citizens as 
free and equal may reasonably be 
expected to endorse in the light of 
principles and ideals acceptable to 
their common human reason (Rawls, 
1993/2005: 137).
I do not agree with the restriction of 
the requirement of providing justifica-
tion based on public reasons only for 
constitutional essentials and the basic 
principles of justice, as in the Rawlsian 
quotation shown above. Like Quong’s 
(Quong, 2011: 273-289) my view is that 
the justification for public reason must 
extend all the way to laws and public pol-
icies. This is the reason why I will use 
expressions like the “justification of laws” 
and not the “justification of constitu-
tional essentials.” I have explained my 
reasons for such an extended use of pub-
lic reason elsewhere (Baccarini, 2015: 14), 
and I do not discuss the question here.
The intention of public reason is to 
protect free and equal citizenship in a 
society as a fair system of cooperation. 
Public reason contributes to this by re-
quiring that the justification of laws is 
addressed to others, which means that 
laws are not justified by sectarian rea-
sons, but only by reasons that all proper-
ly qualified citizens can reasonably ac-
cept.
In my view, Christiano is successful 
in criticizing one possible (and, perhaps, 
dominant) interpretation of the public 
reason view. However, I think that there 
is a better and more fructuous interpre-
tation of the public reason view at the 
disposition of the Rawlsian project. It 
seems that Christiano assumes as his 
critical target a model of public reason 
that operates in the real world as it actu-
ally is. Public reason, thus interpreted, 
must be able to accommodate with real 
world subjects, and with their real world 
commitments. From this, it comes the 
criticism of the impossibility to realize 
the program, because the needed con-
sensus about shared reasons can only be 
utopian.
Alternatively, there is a view of pub-
lic reason that is deliberately an idealiza-
tion. This view is not focused on the 
public justification of laws in the actual 
real world. It shows how public justifica-
tion would function in a well-ordered 
society where citizens were committed 
to liberal values.
The view that I endorse is strongly 
influenced by the proposal of Jonathan 
Quong (Quong, 2011; Quong, 2012a; 
Quong, 2012b). In coherence with his 
view, the Rawlsian proposals’ mistake, 
which opens the space for criticism, is to 
avoid assuming at the beginning of the 
process of constituting publicly justified 
laws and public policies, that all citizens 
would endorse the values or ideals of a 
well-ordered liberal society, as the basis 
of public reasoning in such a society 
(Quong, 2012a: 4). Importantly, in 
Quong’s public reason view,
we do not begin with a commitment 
to public justification, and then only 
accept or endorse subsequent princi-
ples once we are satisfied they meet 
the test of public reason. Rather, we 
begin with certain fairly substantive 
commitments – to the idea of per-
sons as free and equal, to a view of 
society as a fair system of coopera-
tion, and to the fact of reasonable 
pluralism – and these commitments 
lead us to understand that a certain 
subset of our moral rules must meet 
the test of public reason if they are to 
have normative authority over those 
whom they purport to bind (Quong, 
2012b: 56).
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The mistake is to think that public 
justification must be provided to people 
who do not already accept the basic ten-
ets of a liberal conception of justice. In-
stead, the basic tenets of justice must be 
endorsed at the first stage of the justifica-
tory process. They, thus, constitute the 
public reasons endorsed in public justifi-
cation. The rationale for this picture of 
public justification is to show what pub-
lic justification in a well ordered liberal 
society looks like, and it is well explained 
by Quong, who exclaims that the aim of 
employing public reason “is to under-
stand how liberal theory can be made 
internally coherent” (Quong, 2011: 180).
However, something needs to be 
added to the general ideal that Quong 
puts at the justificatory basis of public 
reason in order to render the proposal 
effective. In my view, at the first justifica-
tory level, we must put, together with the 
general ideal of society as a fair system of 
cooperation among free and equal citi-
zens, a substantive specification of this 
ideal, as well. In other words, we must 
include the three main features of all eli-
gible views of justice: certain basic rights 
and liberties, their priority, and the 
means to make use of them (Rawls, 
1993/2005: 6). Together with the idea of 
society as a fair system of cooperation 
among free and equal citizens, they con-
stitute the basis of justification in a 
well-ordered society.
Contrary to this view, Quong puts at 
the first stage only the most general ide-
al. Its role, then, is to justify the three 
main features (Quong, 2011: 174-189). 
But, there is no guarantee that the ideal 
can realize this goal. For example, an al-
ternative, more or merely, proceduralist 
conclusion might be derived from it. The 
ideal of society as a fair system of coop-
eration may be interpreted as giving 
justification to an equal status in the 
procedure of decision making. Again, 
there is no guarantee that liberal princi-
ples of justice will result from this proce-
dural framework. Procedural alternati-
ves are only contingently, and in favora-
ble conditions, related to the pro tections 
of basic liberties and social rights.
The inclusion of the three main fea-
tures of liberal conceptions of justice in 
the first stage might appear as ad hoc, 
but this is not the case in discussion with 
Quong (and, I show bellow, in discus-
sion with Christiano, as well). It is coher-
ent with, moreover a better realization 
of, Quong’s intention of rendering safe 
some substantive liberal rights, and not 
leaving them to justificatory accidents 
(Quong. 2012: 55), like what can happen 
if we interpret the general ideal in a pro-
cedural way. Procedural interpretations 
of free and equal citizenship, can inter-
pret citizens as free and equal only in the 
process of the justification of prescrip-
tions, but there are no guarantees that 
the results of procedures will be substan-
tial, basic liberties and social rights.
The plan of the next part of the paper 
is (i) to describe Christiano’s proposal 
and, in particular, his criticism of public 
reason, and (ii) to show why this criti-
cism does not apply to the view of public 
reason that I endorse. I compare the 
merits of Christiano’s theory and the 
public reason view. Christiano’s propos-
al does not have advantages over the 
public reason proposal, at least inter-
preted as in the view that I embrace. I 
sketch the advantages of this public rea-
son proposal, as well.
2. In Christiano’s view, the argu-
ments and reasons related to all episte-
mologically reasonable worldviews can 
be used in the process of public deliber-
ation (Christiano, 2008: 202-230). Thus, 
each advances what she thinks is the 
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epistemologically most reasonable doc-
trine, and the verdict is established by 
majoritarian vote. This is clearly op-
posed to the Rawlsian view that admits 
only some kind of shared reasons as jus-
tificatory. In Christiano’s terminology, 
he defends the wide conception of public 
deliberation in opposition to the Rawl-
sian narrow conception of public delib-
eration that, in fact, is the public reason 
view. The narrow view is ruled by a prin-
ciple that Rawlsians call reasonableness, 
or reciprocity. The quotation at the be-
ginning of the paper is Rawls’s explana-
tion of the principle of reasonableness, 
or reciprocity.
Christiano exemplifies the theory of 
justice that he criticizes with Joshua Co-
hen’s defence of the Rawlsian principle 
of reasonableness. I do not discuss di-
rectly Cohen’s proposal, nor do I enter 
into the interpretative issues of his theo-
ry. My intention is to discuss Christiano’s 
criticism of public reason and to indicate 
that there is a version of public reason 
that avoids his criticisms.
In the position that Christiano criti-
cizes, citizens are defined as free and 
equal in a moderately procedural way, 
i.e., primarily by having in mind the fact 
that no decision can be unfairly imposed 
on them and no comprehensive doctrine 
can be imposed to them. In other words, 
the primary component of free and 
equal citizenship is constituted by not 
imposing on some citizens laws for 
which these citizens do not have justifi-
cation, and ensuring for all of them a 
procedurally fair condition in the pro-
cess of decision-making. Such a view of 
free and equal citizenship is well repre-
sented in quotations like:
To say that citizens are free is to say, 
inter alia, that no comprehensive mo-
 ral or religious view provides a de-
fining condition of membership or 
the foundation of the authorization 
to exercise political power (Cohen, 
2009: 231)
and
The participants are substantively 
equal in that the existing distribu-
tion of power and resources does not 
shape their chances to contribute to 
deliberation (Cohen, 1997: 397).
This is the basis that leads to the 
shared reasons view of justification: no 
view on which there is disagreement can 
serve as a justification of laws and public 
policies, and, thus, only shared reasons 
can be employed. Obviously, there is op-
timism about the possibility of such 
shared reasons. Such optimism is the 
main target of Christiano’s critique.
Christiano criticizes the shared rea-
sons requirement, and his question is: 
“why must we refrain from proposing 
terms of association on the basis of rea-
sons that we believe to be true or appro-
priate considerations but that we know 
to be incompatible with the reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines others accept?” 
(Christiano, 2008: 206). I discuss Chris-
tiano’s critique of only one of Cohen’s 
arguments, the democratic argument 
(Christiano, 2008: 222-230). The reason 
is that it is in relation to this argument 
that Christiano most clearly pictures his 
alternative to the Rawlsian proposal, and 
the most relevant reasons in favor of his 
alternative to the Rawlsian view.
This choice of argument that I dis-
cuss is related, also, to my intention, not 
to defend Cohen’s proposal, nor to en-
gage in its interpretation, but to show 
that it is possible to offer a formulation 
of public reason that resists Christiano’s 
critical arguments.
The key idea of Cohen’s democratic 
argument is that in order to treat indi-
viduals as free and equal in conditions of 
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reasonable pluralism, power must be 
exercised on shared reasons, because 
passing laws that one can reasonably re-
ject means treating her as inferior.
Christiano denies that the majority 
that passes laws in conformity to what 
they take as the epistemologically most 
reasonable view, and refuses what the 
other side sees as the epistemologically 
most reasonable view, is treating the 
members of the minority as inferiors. 
“The citizens’ views concerning the issue 
at hand are being treated as less reasona-
ble than the ideas the majority is acting 
on. But this is not the same as saying that 
the citizens are being treated as inferi-
ors” (Christiano, 2008: 224). In the wide 
view of the democratic process, citizens 
are treated as equals, because each per-
son’s interests and capacities are taken 
into account properly, and because each 
person is listened to carefully and con-
scientiously, to each person arguments 
are offered conscientiously, and the ver-
dict is based on the better judgment. 
Thus, there is not a case against the wide 
view of democracy from the standpoint 
of equality. It is not disrespectful of peo-
ple’s equality to make decisions on the 
basis of reasons that some can reasona-
bly reject, provided it is made in a dem-
ocratic context where each person can 
advance her views in a fair condition. If 
this condition is satisfied, then every-
body is treated as equal.
To the extent that citizens have equal 
votes, equal resources with which to 
negotiate with others and equal re-
sources with which to participate in 
the process of discussion and debate 
over principles, and to the extent 
that citizens are willing to listen to 
their fellow citizens with an open 
mind and willing to take everyone’s 
interests equally into account when 
making democratic decisions, they 
are treating each other as equals […] 
as much as can be done in a society 
where people disagree (Christiano, 
2008: 229).
This is the most that can be done to 
treat people as equals in the democratic 
process. The public reason model, to 
fulfill its criterion (justification based on 
reasons that each part can reasonably 
accept), needs a utopian consensus for 
sufficient reasons. In the absence of such 
consensus, insisting on some specific 
reasons as the only legitimate justificato-
ry reasons means not being loyal to the 
basic idea of Rawlsian reasonableness. 
On the other hand, decisions must be 
taken even if they are opposed to the 
justificatory reasons of some. But, then, 
the public reason model creates an im-
passe. It is the wide view of democracy 
that represents the realistic way out of 
this impasse, respectful of equality, as 
much as such is possible in a plural 
world.
An additional interest is realized by 
the wide view, as well, in this condition: 
the interest of feeling at home in the 
world. No more than protecting equality 
in the democratic process can be done 
for the interest of feeling at home in the 
world. The reason is, again, related to the 
deliberative impasse indicated above. In 
the case of deep pluralism, in order to 
respect others’ interests of feeling at 
home in the wolrd, one must sacrifice 
this interest for herself. The conclusion 
is that
in a pluralistic society or indeed any 
moderately complex society, no one 
is fully at home in their world. This is 
what gives a point to the principle of 
equality: since there are conflicts of 
interests including the interest in 
being at home in the world, we want 
to structure the world so that each 
person’s interest in being at home in 
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the world is advanced equally. And 
democracy gives us a publicly clear 
way to do just that (Christiano, 2008, 
229).
Another objection that Christiano 
addresses to the Rawlsian view is that 
the bases of Rawls’s public reasons (like 
the idea of free and equal citizens) are so 
general that diverse citizens can accept 
them it in the general formulation, but 
they can strongly disagree on the specif-
ic interpretation. Thus, they do not have 
a common justificatory basis. Think about 
the libertarian view of freedom, as op-
posed to Rawls’s view of free citizenship. 
Both assume free citizenship as a basic 
value, but the interpretation of the value 
is radically different. Thus, we do not 
have shared justificatory reasons even if 
general formulations are shared (Chris-
tiano, 1997: 267-271). If the Rawlsian 
view is enforced, this is an imposition 
over the libertarian (if the principle of 
legitimacy of laws is that they be en-
forced only if they are justified to all in 
virtue of the mere overlap of actual be-
liefs).
An argument related to those seen 
above that Christiano offers against the 
shared reasons’ view of justification is 
that “we have reason to think that the 
principle of reasonableness [Rawls’s lib-
eral principle of legitimacy] is inegalitar-
ian” (Christiano, 2008: 229). The reason, 
he says, is that it puts those people who 
would base public justification on other 
values and not only on shared reasons in 
an unequal position. The inequality is 
represented by not allowing some peo-
ple to employ the justification of laws or 
public policies related to what they see as 
the best reasons. People who accept the 
justificatory supremacy of public values 
(i.e. society as a fair system of coopera-
tion among free and equal citizens, as 
well as features of the family of liberal 
conceptions of justice that includes a list 
of basic liberties and rights, their priori-
ty, and resources to use them) are privi-
leged. Others may either endorse differ-
ent reasons in an alternative to those 
endorsed by Rawlsians, or other reasons 
that are potentially in competition and 
potentially have supremacy over the 
Rawlsian values. Requiring that all justi-
fication must be based only on shared 
reasons is discriminatory toward these 
people.
The last of Christiano’s criticisms of 
public reason that I show is related to the 
fact that for the public reason proposal it 
is not indispensable that citizens agree 
about conclusions. Although reasons for 
the normative conclusions are shared, 
there may be divergences on their rela-
tive weight and on their interpretation. 
Such divergences are resolved by demo-
cratic decision. But, then, Christiano 
objects to Rawlsians when they intro-
duce the criterion of voting as the solu-
tion to an absence of consensus. He says 
that in this way they introduce a concept 
different from the criterion of legitimacy 
that they generally endorse. Majority 
voting is a criterion of legitimacy that 
finds its legitimacy by virtue of treating 
all as equals in the procedure of decision 
making. The criterion of legitimacy is 
that each citizen has an equal say in the 
decision making process. But it allows 
making decisions even if they are not 
justified (i.e., supported by sufficient 
reasons) for some, which is in opposi-
tion to the legitimacy criterion of public 
reason. The problem, now appears to be 
that either decisions made by majority 
voting are not legitimate (because the 
decision is not justified for some), or the 
criterion based on the liberal principle 
of legitimacy is not needed, because ma-
jority voting is able to do the job (Chris-
tiano, 1997: 264-266).
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3.1. In order to reply to Christiano’s 
proposal, it is important to endorse a 
concept of public reason that is substan-
tial, i.e., it is not intended to protect citi-
zens as free and equal only when they 
choose laws by placing them in a proce-
dural position symmetrical to that of 
others by the resource of the shared rea-
sons’ justificatory requirement. The 
Rawls ian view (in the version that I em-
brace) does not ground legitimacy 
merely on the general persuasiveness of 
the reasons for a law. The reasons that 
matter are not those that are generally 
persuasive, nor related merely to proce-
dural fairness, but those that are sub-
stantively constitutive of the ideal of free 
and equal citizenship in a society as a 
fair system of cooperation.
To the objection that this ideal is 
vague, the Rawlsian reply is that there is 
a compelling specification of this broad 
ideal. It goes together with citizens’ basic 
rights, liberties and opportunities, their 
priority, as well as the resources to use 
them (Rawls, 1993/2005: 6). These are 
the three features of all reasonable (in 
Rawls’s sense) conceptions of justice. 
They function as valid public reasons. 
These are values to which we must ap-
peal when we address justification to our 
fellow citizens as free and equal, and we 
must ground public justification on them.
Grounding all public justification on 
such reasons and on reasons derivative 
from them in addition to a formal pro-
cedure that, in some way, ensures an 
equal say in the decision making proce-
dure, or, perhaps, as a corrective of this 
procedure, is motivated by the intention 
to avoid legislation that substantially 
treats citizens as not free and less than 
equal. This is justified, because proce-
dural equality is not the only component 
of the conception of equality. Even in a 
process of democratic decision making 
that respects the conditions that Chris-
tiano lists (“citizens have equal votes, 
equal resources with which to negotiate 
with others and equal resources with 
which to participate in the process of 
discussion and debate over principles, 
[…] citizens are willing to listen to their 
fellow citizens with an open mind and 
willing to take everyone’s interests equal-
ly into account when making democrat-
ic decisions”) infringements of basic 
rights and liberties, or social and demo-
cratic and social rights are possible in a 
decisional process where the justifica-
tions of decisions are fully left to partici-
pants.1 Christiano is aware of this, and 
for this reason he indicates components 
of equality that are not exhausted by 
procedural equality, as I show above.
3.2. The interpretation of the Rawl-
sian view, according to which the justi-
ficatory reasons are not merely the em-
pirical overlapping consensus of the 
doctrines of people who compose the 
political society, but reasons that ideal-
ized citizens address to each other as free 
and equal by having in mind a substan-
tial view of freedom and equality, helps 
to avoid Christiano’s criticism of Cohen’s 
democratic argument. The main basis 
for Christiano’s criticism of the public 
reason project is that public reason is 
necessarily not loyal to itself. It requires 
a utopian consensus about shared rea-
sons, and, in the absence of such consen-
sus, it is impossible to address justifica-
tion as interpreted by public reason to all 
citizens, and, thus, the condition of re-
1 To be sure, we do not have real evidence that 
this would really happen, because it is diffi-
cult to think that there has been any demo-
cratic deliberation that satisfies Christiano’s 
demanding constraints in a wide scale socie-
ty, and, thus, there is no evidence to disprove 
his claim. 
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specting fellow citizens as free and equal 
is not satisfied.
The objection is avoided, because 
public reason does not address justifica-
tion to real life citizens, but to idealized 
citizens, i.e., to reasonable citizens who 
already endorse a substantial view of 
free and equal citizenship.
Here, the difference between the 
public reason view that Christiano criti-
cizes, and the one that I embrace is clear. 
In the former view, freedom and equali-
ty are harmed when decisions are made 
on the basis of reasons that some reject. 
The view that I endorse is more substan-
tial. Free and equal citizenship is harmed 
when decisions are made on the basis of 
a justification that neglects substantial 
components of freedom and equality. 
This interpretation of public reason, that 
renders public reason requirements more 
substantial than the alternative interpre-
tation endorsed so far, avoids the objec-
tions described above. The interpreta-
tion of public justification that I put for-
ward here avoids the indicated criticism, 
because it requires only acceptability in 
virtue of the reasons that are such from 
the idealized perspective of citizens as 
substantially free and equal. It is not 
needed to successfully address justifica-
tion to real life people who do not en-
dorse basic liberties, and democratic and 
social rights. As a consequence, it is not 
true that the program is not loyal to it-
self.
Importantly, even if Christiano af-
firms the defense of procedural equality, 
he is aware of the risk that substantial 
components of public equality can be 
harmed in the democratic process. This 
is why he declares some liberal rights 
(freedom of conscience, freedom of per-
sonal pursuit, freedom of association, 
freedom of expression, basic personal 
property, fair trial and to be treated in 
accordance with due process of law) and 
democratic rights as limits on democrat-
ic authority.
There are reasonably clear limits to 
the authority of democracy and they 
can be derived from the same princi-
ple of public equality that underlies 
democratic authority (Christiano, 
2008: 260).
A guaranteed economic minimum 
and not being permanently outvoted 
sensibly weaken the authority of democ-
racy.
All these values are part of what con-
stitutes public equality, the same as dem-
ocratic rights, and this is the reason why 
they can put limits to, or, at least, weaken 
the authority of democracy (Christiano, 
2008: 260-300).
This is clearl an important point. For 
Christiano, as well as in the view of 
 public reason that I endorse, procedural 
equality in a democratic process is not 
sufficient to protect substantial equality. 
Some values have normative authority 
prior to the responses of democratic 
process. This permits us to reject Chris-
tiano’s inequality objection to public 
reason.
3.3. Remember that the inequality 
argument objects that public reason dis-
criminates against citizens that do not 
share the egalitarian liberal values that 
public reason establishes as the sufficient 
justificatory standard of laws, because 
they embrace different values, or they 
embrace as equally important other val-
ues, potentially in competition with the 
values that Rawls takes as fundamental 
for public justification (Christiano, 2008: 
229).
My reply is that the view of public 
justification that appeals to shared pub-
lic reasons addressed to citizens as free 
and equal is no more inegalitarian, if we 
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evaluate equality from this point of view, 
than Christiano’s theory. To be sure, 
Christiano endorses the wide view of 
public deliberation, i.e., everybody is al-
lowed to use all reasons that she finds to 
be the best reasons in the process of pub-
lic justification. But, at the same time, he 
puts limits to the authority of democrat-
ic decision making.
What is the main difference between 
the Rawlsian and Christiano’s position? 
Rawlsians protect liberal and egalitarian 
values by making them the exclusive 
reasons employed in public deliberation, 
while Christiano protects basic liberties, 
and social and democratic rights, from 
the authority of democracy by declaring 
them as limits to the democratic author-
ity. Thus, there is no authority if a deci-
sion that abolishes the freedom of ex-
pression is made on the basis of a merely 
procedurally fair decision. For any deci-
sion, if some people complain about it 
and they appeal to the protected values 
(basic freedoms, economic minimum, 
etc.), then it is needed to defend the pol-
icy on exactly the terms of these values. 
Otherwise, the domain is exempt from 
democratic decision. At least, this is how 
I interpret Christiano’s position.
Think about the possible example of 
pornography. An assembly deliberates 
on forbidding it. There is a complaint 
from the standpoint of freedom of ex-
pression. At this point, a reply is needed 
in order to show that the decision is not 
harmful towards the freedom of expres-
sion. If this is not done, the decision 
loses its authority.
In other words, in the case of com-
plaints that appeal to protected values a 
defense is required that manages similar 
concepts to those that the Rawlsian per-
spective indicates as appropriate. Citi-
zens are free to use all the reasons they 
find appropriate, but only until a com-
plaint that appeals to the values protect-
ed from democratic deliberation is ex-
pressed. At this point, those people who 
are more skilled, or who prefer, to use 
liberal ideals and principles in public 
justification are in the advantage. Their 
justificatory resources function as trumps. 
In relation to the legitimacy of using a 
full set of reasons that different people 
want to use, Christiano is more generous 
in the course of the deliberative process, 
but, this advantage disappears, because 
he accepts as dominant reasons of the 
kind of Rawlsian public reasons at the 
end of the process, where some demo-
cratic and procedurally fair decisions 
can be found losing authority.2
Thus, the major difference between 
Christiano and Rawlsians in this debate 
does not consist in not constraining the 
democratic process, or putting some 
limits to the democratic process. There 
are limits to the democratic process on 
both sides. The relevant question is 
whether it is better to leave the use of 
reasons in the democratic debate uncon-
trolled, and, then, ensure basic liberal, 
social and democratic rights by denying 
authority to some democratic decisions 
that can be seen as damaging to these 
rights and liberties (apart if those who 
object to the exclusion are able to appeal 
to concepts that, broadly speaking, in 
their content correspond to Rawlsian 
public reasons), or it is better to regulate 
the process from the beginning, by ad-
mitting only justification based on rea-
sons that citizens address to each other 
as substantively free and equal? In my 
view, the Rawlsian option has advantag-
es.
2 Thanks to Kai Spiekermann for having help -
ed me to formulate in this terminology the 
distinction between Rawls’s and Christiano’s 
view.
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In Christiano’s model citizens appear 
to be tutored. They are free to debate and 
decide as they want, but not when there 
is a complaint that appeals to basic liber-
ties, etc., if they are not able to use public 
reasons. In such a case they must simply 
accept that issues are settled without 
their participation. In the Rawlsian 
model, citizens, on the other hand, are 
limited in the reasons that they can em-
ploy, but they can deliberate on all issues. 
They do this by having in mind the rea-
sons that are relevant for citizens who 
address to each other justification as 
substantially free and equal citizens. 
This has several important consequenc-
es. One is that, in this way, they become 
trained and more familiar with the val-
ues. The other one is that they are the 
protagonists of the creation of the socie-
ty inspired by the values of freedom and 
equality among citizens. As the third 
virtue, I mention the ability to pre-empt 
injustices, instead of the need to repair 
them.3
This is particularly visible in one 
case that reduces the authority of demo-
cratic decisions: the permanent outvot-
ing of persistent minorities. In such a 
case members of the persistent minority 
feel as alienated and as strangers in the 
world where they live. It appears that the 
interest of feeling at home in the world is 
threatened (Christiano, 2008: 288-292). 
This is avoided in the process of public 
justification by the public reason view of 
justification. We can find the explana-
tion in Quong’s discussion of the scope 
of public reason. In one of the examples 
of employing public reason outside the 
domain of constitutional essentials, he 
indicates there is the use of the public 
3 Nebojsa Zelic remarks the role of public rea-
son justification in shaping a community 
(Zelic, 2016).
reason of fairness (Quong, 2011: 280-
281). Imagine a situation where in a 
town churches related to one religion 
have already been built. Members of an-
other religion do not have any church in 
their town. The virtue of fairness that 
can be used in the deliberative process as 
a weighty public reason, at one point, 
indicates that the priority is that of 
building a church for the minority reli-
gion, if the question is to build a church. 
We can easily imagine several similar 
examples. In brief, the public reason of 
fairness is a resource to block, during 
public justification, the process in which 
a minority is permanently outvoted.
The appeal to fairness in this case 
will be more egalitarian in the results, 
for persistent minorities, than the prin-
ciple that Christiano puts forward for 
limiting outvoting of persistent minori-
ties, i.e. the minimum outcome stand-
ard. Fairness does not favor only a mini-
mum of outcomes, but outcomes pro-
portional to those for the majority.
This is not necessarily viewed as an 
advantage from all evaluative stand-
points. But possibly there is an advan-
tage for the Rawlsian view that might be 
perceived as such even from the demo-
cratic perspective of Christiano. The 
Rawlsian view clearly indicates where 
permanent outvoting is removed: in the 
process of public justification, i.e., dur-
ing the qualified democratic process.
Where is the permanent outvoting 
of permanent minorities corrected in 
Christiano’s view? One possibility is af-
ter the democratic process. This possi-
bility is opposed to democracy as a fea-
ture of public equality and, thus, it would 
be better to find a different solution.
Alternatively, the permanent outvot-
ing of a permanent minority is avoided 
during the democratic process. It is here 
that it is possible to appeal to the mini-
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mum outcome standard to interrupt 
permanent outvoting. But, in such a 
case, I do see where there is a difference 
with the employment of public reasons, 
like in the Rawlsian view of justification. 
The minimum outcome standard ap-
pears to function exactly like the princi-
ple of fairness in a Rawlsian process of 
justification.
3.4. Is this sectarian? That is, is it sec-
tarian to pre-empt disrespecting basic 
rights and liberties in public deliberation 
by assuming specific justificatory rea-
sons in the process of public justification 
(Gaus, 2012)? Importantly for the pres-
ent debate, this is not an argument that 
Christiano can use in relation to the 
public reason view that I endorse. He 
assumes values and normative contents 
that are settled by the theoretician prior 
to the deliberative process of citizens, 
and not all citizens in the real world en-
dorse these norms. To be sure, contrary 
to the public reason project, Christiano 
is engaged in justifying the values that 
constitute his conception of justice in a 
way that Quong would call external de-
fense. But public reason is not incompat-
ible with such an enterprise. Although 
the public reason project is not engaged 
in it (because it is engaged in a different 
stage of the debate, i.e., in the stage when 
public reasons are already settled and are 
employed for further justification), it 
can make use of such enterprises as a 
form of external justification for the 
public reasons employed. There is no 
motive as to why a public reason project 
might not use, for example, Christiano’s 
defense of the substantial components of 
equality as such a resource. Alternative-
ly, public reason can assume the basic 
values, and leave it to each person to find 
their justification (Quong, 2011: 188). 
Thus, a supporter of public reason can 
applaud Christiano’s, and other authors’ 
justifications of basic liberties, and social 
and democratic rights, and suggest to 
them that they abandon pure procedur-
alist democratic models, and endorse a 
public reason democratic model for fur-
ther justification, after the basic values 
have been established and endorsed.
Still, there can be the objection that 
both the public reason view, even if it 
employs supportive theories (like Chris-
tiano’s, and other liberal theories), is not 
sufficiently respectful of pluralism. There 
might be, and there are, epistemological-
ly reasonable doctrines that oppose lib-
eral values and ideals, at least as suffi-
cient justificatory reasons. In such a 
case, I would be ready to accept that 
there are limits to the external justifica-
tion of liberalism. At this point, two 
things can still be said in favor of the 
liberal conception of justice.
One is indicated by Brian Barry.
If the parties want peace enough to 
make the concessions that are need-
ed to reduce their demands so that 
they become compatible, liberalism 
proposes a formula for doing so. 
More than that, liberal principles 
can make a moral appeal as a fair 
way of solving conflict, because they 
offer the parties equal treatment. 
There is, however, no guarantee that 
either peace or equity will be regard-
ed by everybody as more important 
than winning (Barry, 2001: 25).
It seems to me reasonable to classify 
such people as unreasonable, and to ex-
clude their reasons as legitimate reasons 
for political justification.
To all others, liberalism has some-
thing important to say. Although it is not 
a magic bullet in the course of history, it 
has proven to be successful as a way out 
from persistent conflicts, starting from 
those among Catholics and Protestants. 
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Rival conceptions of justice can hardly 
demonstrate equivalent credentials. Lib-
eral conceptions of justice have been the 
basis of those constitutions that have re-
sulted from this process, i.e., the basic 
values of liberal conceptions of justice 
are the fundamental values of constitu-
tional democracies. Thus, the public 
reason program can represent a project 
that shows what consistently living in 
ac cordance with these values would 
mean. The program would, thus, not be 
an example of sectarianism, but of co-
herence.
After all, it might be important to 
show that some political proposals that 
are not explicitly declared to be loyal to 
the basic values of constitutional democ-
racies, may be revealed to be so.
3.5. The interpretation of public rea-
son that I endorse helps to reply to 
Christiano’s generality and vagueness 
objection, as well. The critique would be 
appropriate if the Rawlsian requirement 
were that laws must be simply justified 
to all in virtue of the reasons that they 
actually endorse. But this is not the most 
fruitful interpretation of the Rawlsian 
program. As I have said, it is more fruc-
tuous to interpret the Rawlsian program 
as promoting justification based on rea-
sons that idealized citizens address each 
others as substantially free and equal. In 
the light of this project, we can classify 
some endorsements of values as justifi-
catory reasons for laws and public poli-
cies as simply mistaken. Thus, in relation 
to Christiano’s objection that, for exam-
ple, the libertarian conception is a coun-
ter-example to the alleged overlapping 
consensus, the possible reply open to 
Rawlsians is simply to say that the liber-
tarian interpretation of freedom as de-
tached from equality is wrong. Actually, 
this is what Rawls says. Precisely, Rawls 
says that it is unreasonable (Rawls, 
1993/2005: lvi; Rawls, 2001; 137-138). 
There are several ways to indicate that 
libertarianism is wrong, and Christiano 
has reliably indicated one of them 
(Christiano, 2008: 112-116). A support-
er of the Rawlsian program can rely on 
these argumentations in order to exclude 
libertarianism from the eligible set of 
conceptions of justice.
3.6. I end the paper by discussing a 
further objection that Christiano ad-
dresses to the public reason view. It is the 
objection that Rawlsians cannot adopt 
democratic authority, and their criterion 
of justification, at the same time.
Again, I think that the particular in-
terpretation of the Rawlsian project that 
I endorse helps to avoid the criticism. 
The basic criterion of legitimacy is that 
of providing justification on the basis of 
substantial reasons that citizens can ad-
dress each other as free and equal. Once 
the debate is shaped by this constraint, 
we can expect that there will be disa-
greements that we must resolve by vot-
ing. However, it is important that voting 
appears only under such a condition, 
where the alternatives are all justified 
(although inconclusively, in the mean-
ing of the concept in (Gaus, 1996: 151-
156) and (Williams, 2000)) on the basis 
of reasons that citizens can address each 
other as substantially free and equal. This 
guarantees that the result of voting will 
not harm anyone’s status as a free and 
equal citizen. The two criteria of legiti-
macy (justification based on reasons that 
citizens can address to each other as free 
and equal, and majority vote) are not ri-
vals, but complementary.
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Sloboda i jednakost u pluralističkom društvu.  
Pojašnjenje i obrana teorije javnoga uma
SAŽETAK Članak je posvećen Chirstianovoj kritici Ralwsovog koncepta javnog uma. Iako 
je Christianova kritika uspješna kada se radi o jednoj interpretaciji javnog uma, bolja i 
plodnija interpretacija javnog uma moguća je unutar Rawlsovog projekta. Ovakvo razu-
mijevanje javnog uma počiva na namjernoj idealizaciji. Takva idealizacija pokazuje kako 
bi javno opravdanje funkcioniralo u dobro uređenom društvu gdje su građani predani li-
beralnim vrijednostima. Zajednički razlozi relevantni za javno opravdanje predstavljeni su 
u idealu društva kao pravičnog sustava kooperacije između slobodnih i jednakih gra-
đana, kao i u tri odrednice liberalne koncepcije pravednosti (temeljna prava i slobode, 
njihov prioritet, te način na koji se koriste). Ovakav pristup javnom umu izbjegava Christi-
anov prigovor utopijskog karaktera zajedničkih razloga, te odgovara na argument nejed-
nakosti, prigovor općenitosti, te argument nekonzistentnosti. U odgovoru na argument 
nejednakosti, pojašnjene su prednosti pristupa javnog uma nad Christianovim pristupom 
proceduralne demokracije.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI Christiano, demokracija, javni um, Quong, Rawls
